The food laws of Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 are among the great enigmas of biblical law. Prodigious efforts have been made since at least Philo's time to identify rationales that might provide the basis for the choice of calling some creatures clean and others unclean. 1 Yet despite these efforts, no conclusive explanation
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of any rule sees it as covering all cases that may be subsumed under the meaning of its words.
There is another way of thinking about language and legal rules, however, and this is to adopt a narrative approach. Narrative meaning consists of typical stories or images that are evoked by the use of words. It arises in the context of a group that shares the social knowledge necessary to evoke those images, without needing to spell them out. 9 Whereas a semantic interpretation asks, What is the literal meaning of the words?, a narrative approach asks, What typical situations do the words of this rule evoke? This means that the narrative image represents the core of the message: thus, the further one departs from the typical case, the less sure one can be that the message is intended to apply to a different fact situation or would be regarded as applicable by the audience. 10 Although Jackson himself does not make this claim, the advantage of his approach is that it takes seriously the fact that the biblical laws function in a high-context society where "most of the information [or message] is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. " 11 Jackson's theory has been developed in relation to a specific part of the biblical legal collections, namely, the Covenant Code; whether it applies more widely must be addressed in relation to individual laws. This raises the question of whether the biblical food laws should be regarded as narrative paradigms or paradigm cases. It is not an idle question. One of the most difficult aspects of the food laws has traditionally been the formulation of Deut 14:19-20:
And all winged insects are unclean for you; they shall not be eaten. All clean winged things you may eat.
Might the historical difficulties with reading this text have something to do with the projection of an anachronistic semantic reading? If so, might a narrative reading be more fruitful? It is certainly the case that verses 19-20 are problematic from a semantic perspective; thus, Jacob Milgrom describes them as a "cryptic generalization. " 12 Worse, as many have noted, the verses seem to contradict each other. Verse 19 apparently makes a blanket statement banning all winged insects, without qualification, as being unclean. Verse 20, however, goes straight on to say that there are winged things that are clean, which is not what verse 19 explicitly says. From a modern, semantic point of view, it looks like bad draftsmanship.
J. Gordon McConville thinks that Deut 14:20 presupposes "some body of assumed knowledge such as Lev 11:21-22, " 13 while Richard D. Nelson states that Deut 14:20 "can only be understood in light of Lev 11:20-23, where it is clear that edible insects (locusts) are meant. " 14 Such claims are based on the assumption that the food laws in Leviticus are prior to those in Deuteronomy. 15 Yet, even if we accept that Deuteronomy is later, it does not follow that just because we presume that Lev 11:21-22 was necessary to fill in the detail of Deut 14:20, this was also true for the audience of Deut 14:20. Indeed, the assumption that a particular law could have made sense to the original audience only if it was explicitly spelled out in another piece of legislation is a classic example of a semantic approach. We can at least raise the possibility that Deut 14:20 could make (better) sense when read narratively. In any case, it is not sufficient to solve the problem of Deut 14:20 by appealing to Leviticus, because similar problems are found in Lev 11 itself. For example, it is frequently noted that Lev 11:13-19 "fails to offer any criterion of edibility" 16 in regard to birds, which is to concede that Lev 11 can be as elliptical as Deut 14:20. For these reasons, it is important to move beyond a semantic reading of these texts.
Certainly, the picture changes when the text is viewed from a narrative perspective. If the classifications of clean and unclean insects in Lev 11:20-23 and Deut 14:19-20 are constructed as narrative typifications, that is, as typical images that make sense according to a shared body of social knowledge, then the typical image of the "unclean winged insect" is the flightless insect that "walks on all fours" (Lev 11:20), whereas the stereotypical picture of the "clean winged insect" is one that flies in the air. The laws make perfect sense because the relevant background social knowledge is assumed by the legislator.
Biblical law provides a clear parallel in Exod 22:2-3 (MT 22:1-2), which concerns the liability of a householder for using force against a burglar: According to a modern semantic approach to this case, the drafting of verses 2 and 3 seems odd and contradictory. The first part of the rule apparently gives carte blanche to the householder who kills an intruder at any time of day or night, while the second part denies self-help if the break-in occurs during the day. The text makes perfect sense, however, according to a narrative approach, which asks, What is the typical situation evoked by the words "tunneling thief "? Although this situation may be unfamiliar, the idea that thieves tunneled into houses at night is mentioned in other biblical texts (e.g., Job 24:14-16). In other words, from a narrative perspective, it is clear that the typical situation evoked by the words in Exod 22:2 (MT 22:1) is one in which the thief tunnels at night. There is therefore no tension with the subsequent part of the rule, which contrasts the legitimate action of the householder at night with the illegitimate action of the householder by day. 17 Just as the audience of Exod 22:2 supplies to the text "If the thief is seized while tunneling at night …," so the audience of Deut 14:19 supplies "all winged and flightless insects are unclean. " If it is the case that a narrative reading can make better sense of one part of the biblical food laws, the question arises whether it works for all the other categories as well. This is the focus of the next section.
II. A Narrative Approach to the Biblical Food Laws
Scholars have noted that some biblical food-law verses express "principles" or "criteria, " while other verses provide "examples" and "lists. " 18 There has been little reflection, however, on whether these terms adequately describe the legal reasoning at work in the texts, or even how these different elements are assembled to make a certain kind of sense. In my view, the legal reasoning at work is one of the most interesting features of Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20. 19 To be sure, Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 cover similar ground. 20 But, while the substantive similarities between the two documents are frequently recognized, their remarkable structural similarities are often overlooked. In both documents, some information is explicitly communicated while other information is taken for granted (see table 1 
A. Land Animals
The land animals of Lev 11:3-8 and Deut 14:4-8 have presented particular difficulties for commentators. For example, Nelson complains that the catalog of unclean animals omits, for example, the "unclean ass" (Exod 34:20). 23 Similarly, W. H. Bellinger Jr., in claiming that "the categorization [of clean land animals] is probably not as clear as the text would suggest, " 24 assumes that this is so because it does not formulate matters in the manner of a modern legal rule. Yet such omissions are problematic for the modern, semantic approach. Under a paradigmatic approach it hardly matters that the law is incomplete or unclear.
In fact, both Lev 11:3 and Deut 14:6 explicitly state that the narrative paradigm, or typical image, of the clean animal is one that has split hooves and chews the cud, that is, an animal that eats grass. The question why this is the typical image of the clean animal is a separate matter that I will consider in section III. This image having been established, the next move is the negation of the paradigm case by means of a binary opposition. 25 Thus, animals that do not have cleft hooves and do not chew the cud are unclean. Setting out an explicit paradigm of what is cleanwhich implies a paradigm of what is unclean-is highly efficient teaching. Nothing is explicitly said about the category of animals that do not have cleft hooves and do not chew the cud-reckoned to be about 90 percent of all species of Middle Eastern mammals 26 -because nothing needs to be said. It is implied social knowledge: the 22 Scholars occasionally characterize the criteria for identifying clean animals as a "paradigm" or "template. " This is some distance from identifying the laws as narrative paradigms or paradigm cases, as discussed in section I above. 23 "Binary oppositions" are a form of semantic relations. They refer to a pair of terms that are conventionally, and not necessarily logically, regarded as opposites (e.g., black/white, day/night, and wet/dry). Their construction is dependent on social context: it is this that determines whether the appropriate opposition of a "boy" is a "girl" or a "man. " Binary oppositions are an important aspect of sense making. As Jackson notes, "Classi fications appear natural or intelligible where we have a correlation of normally associated binary oppositions" (Wisdom-Laws, 259). 26 See table 6 of Hunn, "Abominations, " 113.
paradigm of the clean animal is simply flipped around. The creation of a narrative paradigm that is simply inverted means that an animal that belongs to one category can never belong to the other. The way in which the food laws are constructed thus provides complete clarity. In fact, it is precisely because the audience has already internalized the paradigm of the unclean animal that the legislator can subsequently reel off examples of unclean animals, in verse 29, including the "mole rat" and the "mouse. " But they are there for illustration only. We do not need a list of the other 90 percent of unclean animals because the paradigm case of the clean animal has already done the work. 27 As a form of legal reasoning, it is remarkably effective.
What about land animals that either (a) chew the cud but do not have hooves, or (b) have hooves but do not chew the cud? This is addressed in Lev 11:4-8 and Deut 14:7-8. In terms of legal reasoning, it seems that these are deliberately presented as "hard cases. " 28 They are "half one thing and half another, " so their status cannot be deduced either from the explicit paradigm of what is clean or from the implied paradigm of what is unclean. Leviticus 11:4-7 and Deut 14:7-8 confirm that the clean animal must have both elements of the paradigm (i.e., hooves and chews the cud). If one element is missing, the paradigm is negated and the animal is regarded as unclean. 29 The use of hard cases thus reinforces the narrative paradigms of clean and unclean.
B. Aquatic Creatures
A semantic approach to the aquatic creatures of Lev 11:9-12 and Deut 14:9-10 can be seen in Walter C. Houston's claim that the subsection on aquatic creatures is "highly redundant" 30 in Leviticus, presumably because of the lack of detail. Gerhard 27 Despite Nelson's concern regarding lack of completeness, this narrative reading strengthens and redefines his view that the references to unclean animals in Deut 14:7-8 are "representative examples to show the reader how to apply the template of verse 6" (Deuteronomy, 180). Seth D. Kunin rightly observes that the permitted animals mentioned are "only examples of a more general class, " though he does not see this in terms of a narrative paradigm ( 28 Kunin comes close in seeing "the lists of ambiguous examples … as examples of where to place difficult cases" (We Think What We Eat, 41). Interestingly Kunin's comments regarding the anomaly in structuralist thought-here, where animals have one characteristic but not anotherapply equally well to hard cases. Like anomalies, hard cases are not intrinsic. And just as different systems give rise to different types of anomaly, so different laws and forms of legal interpretation create different types of hard cases. 29 In Lev 11:4-7 and Deut 14:7-8, each element of the paradigm case of the clean animal is explicitly negated by the appropriate binary opposition (either "it chews the cud but does not part the hoof " [Lev 11:6 = Deut 14:7] or "it parts the hoof and is cloven-footed but does not chew the cud" [Lev 11:7 = Deut 14:8]). 30 Houston, Purity and Monotheism, 234-35.
von Rad sees the aquatic creatures, like all the categories, as drawing on earlier "lists" and "catalogues, " 31 while Erhard S. Gerstenberger supposes that the redactor of Deut 14:9-10 lacked access to "more specific instructions, " 32 which, he implies, would have been necessary and desirable. A narrative approach, on the other hand, works as follows. As with the land animals, Lev 11:9 and Deut 14:9 establish the paradigm of the clean aquatic creature: "Everything in the waters that has fins and scales.…" In contrast to the land animals, however, the clean paradigm is explicitly negated in Lev 11:10, 12 and Deut 14:10. The unclean aquatic creature is "anything in the seas or the rivers that does not have fins and scales" (Lev 11:10).
What about the handling of hard cases, for example, aquatic creatures that have scales but not fins, or fins but not scales? We already know from the treatment of "half and half " land animals that, if one element is missing, the paradigm is negated and the creature is unclean. I suggest that it is for this reason that nothing is said about hard cases here. The audience can work out the paradigm on the basis of the foregoing. As such, it can be said to be a substantive implicit paradigm. The subsequent content of Lev 11:29-30 makes sense against this background. Leviticus 11:29-30 lists a number of "half and half " aquatic creatures, including "the great lizard of any kind, the gecko, the monitor lizard, the lizard, the sand lizard, and the chameleon"-all creatures that have scales (as fish do) but do not live in water. 33 The purpose of the list is to confirm what the audience has already been told, implicitly, that all these creatures are unclean.
C. Birds
With regard to the birds as described in Lev 11:13-19 and Deut 14:11-18, again we may briefly note some of the semantic assumptions made by commentators. Of the clean birds, Martin Noth says, "Naturally they included all not in the list of the forbidden [birds], " an assumption shared by Thomas Hieke. 34 Similarly, Jeffrey H. Tigay states that it is generally presumed that all birds that are not listed as impure were permissible. 35 All commentators claim that the lists in Lev 11:13-19 and Deut 14:11-18 are closed; that is, they contain only the listed birds, regardless of the possible existence of similar unclean birds that have yet to be considered by jurists. But why presume that the list of unclean birds is exhaustive? This assumption arises only from a semantic approach. Houston likewise assumes that the list 31 "must be comprehensive, and therefore includes creatures that nobody who was not starving can have any mind to eat, such as hoopoes and bats!" 36 Again, this reading makes semantic assumptions, namely, that the law must be closed and exhaustive, even to the extent of including things that are irrelevant to people's diets. Yet the idea that the lawgiver would include useless information is not in keep ing with the economical style of tôrâ. A narrative approach, once again, would read the texts differently. In contrast to the case of the aquatic creatures, there is here no explicit paradigm of either the clean bird or the unclean bird. Instead, we are given a list of unclean birds in both Lev 11 and Deut 14. This presumes there is a shared background understanding of what counts as a clean or an unclean bird. This is especially clear in Deut 14:11, which states, "You may eat all clean birds. " This is another example of legal reasoning in a high-context society-it simply assumes that the audience knows what a clean bird is. We can deduce the image of the clean bird because it is simply opposed to the unclean bird. The clean bird is one that has feathers, flies, and eats what a bird normally eats (berries, insects, and so on). What sets the norm here? The paradigm of the clean bird is implicit because it has already been derived from the fact that the clean land animals are herbivorous. Herbivorous land animals set the norm for the (unarticulated) paradigm of the clean bird.
Thus, against Noth, Tigay, and Houston, the lists in Lev 11:13-19 and Deut 14:11-18 contain representative illustrations of the unarticulated paradigm of the unclean bird. The list is thus open and nonexhaustive. This means that if, for the sake of argument, the Israelites came across a new species of bird that was sufficiently similar to the unarticulated paradigm of the unclean bird, it would be regarded as unclean even though it is not expressly included in the list. In my view, Nelson is wrong to suggest that the list is for "rhetorical emphasis more than practical application. " 37 From a narrative perspective, the laws relating to birds are just as practical as the other categories because they educate the audience about what are typically to be regarded as clean and unclean creatures.
Houston and Nelson both object that the passage in Lev 11:13-19 fails to offer any criterion of edibility. 38 Instead, they provide only a partial list of birds that are not to be eaten. But from a narrative perspective the list is by no means incomplete. Rather, it is important because it supplies the criteria that allow people to determine the permissibility of any given bird. The visual images summoned by the words in the list evoke an implicit paradigm of the unclean bird. 39 It may be significant that the list of unclean birds, in both Lev 11 and Deut 14, begins with those birds that eat land animals because animals are the subject of the first category of creatures in both Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 (see subsection A above). It then moves on to birds that eat fish, because they are the subject of the second category (see subsection B above). I have already noted how the setup of prior blocks of material helps to structure later information (e.g., the handling of hard cases and equating clean with herbivorous). The ordering of the unclean birds is a further example of this internal structuring.
The bat is presumably included, and placed last, because the absence of feathers, together with its bearing live young, means that it is visually farthest from the paradigm of the clean bird. Stereotypical images are affective and draw on a range of senses including, most importantly, sight. The bat negates different characteristics of the clean bird from others on the list because, although the bat eats what clean birds eat, it looks nothing like them. 42 As such, it presents the opposite problem from all the other unclean birds in the list.
D. Insects
The category of insects presents commentators with difficulties similar to those we have already seen for birds, in subsection C above. For Tigay, "the permitted and forbidden winged animals are not distinguished by easily observable external characteristics. Hence, no general rule is given for distinguishing among them, but only a list identifying the impure ones. " 43 As noted in relation to birds, however, there is nothing "only" about a list when it illustrates an assumed paradigm. A narrative perspective would therefore view things differently; the list exists because there is a paradigm. 40 There remains some uncertainty regarding the identification of some birds in the list. See Driver, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy, 162-63; and Houston, Purity and Monotheism, 43-46. 41 It may be the case that the birds are actually hard cases in the sense that, although they have feathers and fly, they do not eat what clean birds eat, and so they negate one of the key characteristics. 42 What about the hoopoe? It is further removed from the stereotypical image of the clean bird than other birds on the list because not only is it omnivorous, but it also has a reputation for being particularly smelly, making its nest out of dung and rubbish. Yet it is not as far removed from the clean paradigm as the bat because it still does at least look like a bird. 43 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 139.
Houston adopts a semantic approach to this category by claiming that insects were included because of the lawgiver's "impulse for comprehensiveness. " 44 By contrast, a narrative reading would not expect an exhaustive account. Further, Houston states that Deut 14:19, which he sees as "the original form of the prohibition, " 45 had the unfortunate effect of excluding locusts, which were an important supplement to the Israelite diet. Yet the idea that Deut 14:19 fails to permit locusts is, again, an example of a semantic approach. It assumes that the verse is to be read as a ban on all winged insects, without qualification. This is contrary to the narrative reading of "all, " advanced in subsection B above. Houston also assumes that Deut 14:19 conflicted with customary dietary practice. This again contrasts with my approach, which sees narrative typifications as drawing on social knowledge. In this case, social knowledge would include the desirability of eating locusts as a source of concentrated protein (see section IV below). There is no need to see Deut 14:19 as being reversed by the subsequent law in Leviticus, in the manner of a modern statute. Both Lev 11 and Deut 14 make sense against a shared body of social knowledge, which includes customary dietary practice.
In setting out a narrative approach to this category, I will concentrate on Lev 11:20-23 because it is more detailed than Deut 14:19-20, discussed in section II above. Leviticus 11:20-23 begins with an explicit paradigm case of the unclean insect-that which goes "on all fours" (Lev 11:20). Reversing this formulation provides an implied paradigm of a clean insect, namely, something that flies around and does not go on all fours. As in the case of clean birds, Leviticus simply assumes that knowledge of the paradigm is part of the audience's social knowledge. As we saw in section II, this assumption is also taken for granted in Deut 14:20.
Leviticus 11:21 is the first verse that provides an exception to the category of the unclean ("among the winged insects that go on all fours you may eat those that have jointed legs above their feet, with which to hop on the ground"). Leaping insects are potentially hard cases because they participate in two catgories. They "go on all fours" but can also be airborne for brief periods. To the point, the food laws declare that if a creature negates just one of the characteristics of the clean paradigm it is to be regarded as unclean. This was the case for land animals and aquatic creatures (and possibly even for birds as well). Contrary to expectations, however, Lev 11:21 states that the leaping insects are not to be regarded as unclean. They are deemed to be sufficiently close to the paradigm of clean flying things because they can be airborne. Another reason why they may be deemed close to the paradigm is because the classic example of leaping creatures-locusts-are herbivorous. We have already noted the herbivorous paradigm for clean animals and birds in subsections A and B above.
Some scholars may have reservations about reading Lev 11:3, 9 and Deut 14:6, 9 as narrative paradigms, or typical images, when-at least on the surface-they provide definitional criteria that are not attached to a particular (animal or aquatic) paradigm or image. My argument still stands, however, because the definitional criteria of Lev 11:3 and Deut 14:6 still make the implied audience think of something. Even today, definitional formulae do not exist purely as abstractions but function in relation to other things with which they are associated. In biblical law, rule elaboration and systematization do not exclude wider, popular associations. For example, Num 35:16 certainly has clear definitional criteria, so much so that David Daube identified it as an example of the "diagnosis" form. 46 Yet the definitional element does not exclude the operation of "gut feelings, " reflected in labeling the killer a murderer.
Leviticus 11:9 and Deut 14:9 may appear to be different, given their use of the word all. Yet even in these verses a narrative approach is helpful, because the word ‫כל‬ ("everything") does not have to be understood literally, as including every single possible example. Even today, if reference is made in modern legislation to "all" or "everything, " its meaning is quickly revised and restricted in the event of an unforeseen or atypical case. It thus remains possible to consider the dietary laws in terms of narrative paradigms, or typical images, when-at least on the surface-they provide definitional criteria.
I acknowledge that positing a narrative approach to the biblical food laws raises certain questions about the development of legal drafting at this stage in the history of biblical law. As noted in section I, Jackson's conceptual model regarding biblical law and narrative was developed in relation to the mišpāṭ îm, or Covenant Code. Jackson claims to find there a relationship between narrative forms of sense construction and the oral underpinnings of the mišpāṭ îm. 47 He contends that this "oral residue" is not completely overlaid, even when the stage of writing has been reached. 48 The question arises whether we might find examples of such oral residue outside the mišpāṭ îm. One might suppose that a Priestly work such as Leviticus would be one of the less likely places in which to find such evidence, given the bureaucratic mode of the Priestly approach and its particular concern for classification. For example, the diagnosis form noted by Daube, occurs only in Priestly sources showing the emerging importance of classification inasmuch as "the legal consequences are impliedly derived not directly from the facts, but from the categorization of the facts as falling within an accepted legal class. " 49 to classification could be regarded as part of a movement from one form of legal reasoning (concrete thinking) to another (abstract thought). 50 If the food laws are best understood as narrative paradigms, we may have an example of oral residue evident not only at the stage of writing but also (in the context of Leviticus) at an advanced stage of legal reasoning as well. 51 Although the Priestly text may reflect a more analytical approach-as befits the professional milieux and internal purposes of the priesthood 52 -we do not have to assume that this element of professional group thinking or language completely overlies the concrete images underlying the classificatory rules. This means that we can still talk about the dietary laws in terms of narrative paradigms or typical images, when-at least on the surface-they provide definitional criteria. In fact, in the form we have them, the dietary laws are interesting for our understanding of the possible development of biblical law inasmuch as they reflect concrete, customary norms and a classificatory schema. Perhaps-and this is a matter of conjecture-the food laws in Leviticus and Deuteronomy are an example of what happens when customary rules are presented with a bureaucratic spin.
To sum up, whereas the biblical food laws in Lev 11 and Deut 14 are problematic when understood in semantic terms, they make very good sense when understood in narrative terms. I have proposed that their literary form should be under stood as narrative "paradigm cases," a category that includes binary oppositions. Their paradigmatic character can be seen in the way in which the food laws proceed by identifying certain characteristics of a taxonomic group that are then negated. Once established, the binary opposite is stated to identify the unclean, but this category is already implied in identifying the clean. This illustrates implied social knowledge that does not require the exhaustive listing of cases because the paradigm case of the clean creature has already done the work. The different categories build on one another, which in turn assumes that the audience accumulates knowledge as the laws progress. As the categories accumulate, so the audience can work out the laws for themselves on the basis of what they have already been told. 
III. Possible Sources of Social Knowledge
In the context of this argument that the food laws make sense as narrative paradigms that depend on social knowledge, the question arises as to what particular sources of social knowledge could make the various paradigm cases seem intuitively clear. Although nothing in my argument in sections I-II depends on identifying such sources, it is worth considering this topic, given that narrative paradigms do not simply arise from nowhere. It takes a particular worldview and mind-set to make certain things appear natural or obvious. 53 In what follows, the term social knowledge is understood as an aspect of sense construction. It is relevant to the thematic level of signification and helps us make sense of data encountered at the level of manifestation, namely, that which is presented to our senses and the particular meaning attributed to it. Social knowledge thus derives from the environment in which we live, being implicit in the level of manifestation itself. 54 It is also organized narratively, being commonly stored and transmitted as "(substantive) narrative stereotypes, themes, [and] images of typifications of action. " 55 To be sure, the narrative organization of material deriving from the environment can include a great deal. It should be obvious, therefore, that when it comes to identifying possible sources of social knowledge that might be relevant, I am not ruling out any particular sort of data. All kinds of phenomena, including texts and traditions, could potentially be relevant for identifying the social knowledge that might have made the paradigm cases seem natural. It is not enough, however, to posit that such-and-such a phenomenon was part of the original audience's environment, and hence their social knowledge. The question is whether this sort of social knowledge could plausibly be said to generate this set of narrative paradigms.
I begin by drawing on data that recent research has considered relevant to the social world inhabited by, or presupposed by, ancient Israelites. The following scholars do not frame their theories in terms of the narrative method I have outlined, but their attempts to find underlying principles for the food laws make claims, whether recognized or not, regarding the social knowledge of the original audience. First, as Mary Douglas has noted, empirical observation that certain creatures have a certain diet was part of ancient Israel's implied social knowledge. 56 53 As Umberto Eco writes, "One (if not the most important) of the semiotic endeavours is to explain why something looks intuitive" (Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language [London: Macmillan, 1984], 9, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17338-9). 54 Although this is undoubtedly true, this datum in itself would not make the narrative paradigms in the food laws seem intuitively clear. On purely empirical grounds a bat, for example, could not be naturally regarded as unclean when it eats what clean birds eat. Second, according to Jacob Milgrom, some underlying sense of social values (regardless of how conceptual these might have been) was part of ancient Israel's implied social knowledge. 57 Certainly we find plenty of places where such concern is reflected in both Leviticus and Deuteronomy, yet this sort of social knowledge could not plausibly have generated the particular narrative paradigms we find in the food laws. How could respect for life produce a classification that encourages killing most types of fish for food or that makes a specific exception to allow the consumption of locusts? Third-and consistent with Houston's claim that ancient Israelite sanctuaries were the loci for developing the classification of clean and unclean animals 58 -ritual or sacrificial practices were part of ancient Israel's implied social knowledge. This claim too is incontestable but fails to explain the paradigm cases of Lev 11 and Deut 14, since fish and insects were not offered for sacrifice in biblical Israel. 59 It does not adequately explain why this social knowledge would make these categories of clean and unclean seem intuitively clear.
Fourth-and consistent with traditional readings that attempt to ground the distinction between clean and unclean creatures in some understanding of life in Eden 60 -ancient Israel's own texts and traditions were part of its implied social knowledge. If, as I claim, the implied audience uses their social knowledge to fill in gaps in the food laws, there is no reason why this should exclude textual or mythical knowledge drawn from the environment. Even if it were to be argued that Gen 2-3 played a significant role in biblical Israel's social knowledge, 61 the notion that this background social knowledge could have generated this particular classification is harder to sustain. 62 How could Edenic imagery, of whatever sort, naturally produce these-and only these-classifications? If Gen 1-3 is so foundational, why is killing any creature for food acceptable? Should we not expect fruit (of whatever sort) to be taboo?
None of the sources of social knowledge that might be suggested by traditional approaches is therefore a plausible candidate for the interpretation of the narrative paradigms. It is not enough, however, to assert (per Nelson) that the clean creatures are conventional: 63 the question is, why are they conventional? We should recognize that claims about the rationale for distinguishing between clean and unclean creatures are based on assumptions and claims about the nature and content of biblical Israel's social knowledge. Therefore, the traditional question, What is the basis of the distinction between clean and unclean creatures? should be prefaced by asking, What is it about these clean and unclean images that makes them appear dominant, and typical, in the context of biblical Israel's social knowledge?
One important factor to consider is the physical world of ancient Israel. 64 Looking, first, at the land animals, one can easily see how, among farmers, the stereotypical image of a clean animal would be one that eats grass because it is the sort of animal most familiar to them. Accordingly, herbivores will be seen as the norm. 65 If one is developing a taxonomic system that distinguishes between clean and unclean, it follows that clean animals will be herbivorous animals. 66 The narrative paradigm is typical precisely because it reflects day-to-day engagement with the environment. Indeed, the order of clean animals in Deut 14:4-5 may reflect the fact that the three kinds of edible domesticated animals (oxen, sheep, goats) give rise, by association, to the seven kinds of edible wild animals (the deer, the gazelle, the roebuck, the wild goat, the ibex, the antelope, and the mountain sheep). The background social knowledge here includes social practices, such as nomadic herding, which are an efficient way of operating environmentally. The paradigm case has intuitive appeal in this context. Further, since the observable characteristics of the norm regarding livestock are animals that have cleft hooves and chew the cud (Lev 11:3 = Deut 14:6), it follows, logically and by implication, that animals that do not have cleft hooves and do not chew the cud are unclean. On this assumption, carnivorous animals are labeled unclean because they are the binary opposite 62 The criterion of vegetarianism hardly applies to herbivores that are deemed unclean, such as the rabbit. 63 66 As Hunn notes, "It is no accident that animals which chew their cud also have hooves -both characteristics favour adaptation to open grassland habitats, which in turn is associated with herding behaviour" ("Abominations, " 114).
of a paradigm that is normative only because it reflects everyday practice. In keeping with this idea, the unclean animals of Deut 14:7 (the camel, the rabbit, and the coney) appear in order of how far removed they are from the paradigm of everyday life.
In this respect, the rules may reflect an underlying distinction between domesticated animals and wild animals. 67 A similar opposition is found in the Covenant Code of Exodus (as well as in Roman and English law), which contrasts the case of the wild goring ox (Exod 21:28-32, 35-36) with that of domesticated depasturation (Exod 22:4). 68 The contrast between tame and wild animals might have particular resonance in Priestly circles because it evokes images from the primeval history. This may be the appropriate connection to make with the Eden story. Vegetarianism correlates with the original Adamic regime (Gen 2:18-20, where arguably all animals were tame, at least to Adam). It also contrasts with the Noahide covenant (Gen 9:2-3); specifically, its permission of animal flesh and the threat to humans from wild animals. 69 Turning to the aquatic creatures, it is possible that the paradigm of the clean fish may be typical because Israelites were most accustomed to fish with fins and scales. In that sense, fins and scales are the aquatic equivalent of hooves and cud for land animals. This is a reasonable suggestion because this categorization does in fact typically represent the vast majority of fish. Against this background, fish with fins and scales are intuitively going to be seen as the norm. Again, the paradigm appears typical because it reflects day-to-day engagement with the environment. Finally, turning to birds and insects, it is possible, once again, that the narrative paradigm is typical because it reflects everyday interaction with the physical world and its constraints. 70 Such insects may have been an essential source of protein, especially during a plague of locusts. 71 The locust is clean, therefore, despite its characteristics. The locust is thus an example of how an object is interpreted to fit the paradigm, rather than the paradigm being interpreted to fit the object. 72 Narrative paradigms are not objective constructs; they are intrinsic only to the social knowledge that gives rise to them. Accordingly, there is no reason why an object 22:3 [MT 22:2b]. 79 Nor are such examples unique to the mišpāṭ îm; Jackson also points to cases outside the mišpāṭ îm, including redress for homicide (Deut 19:6, 12; Num 35:25), 80 and I have noted instances in Leviticus (e.g., the rental value of land, Lev 25:15-17). 81 The point about such self-executing narrative rules is that they are manifestations of practical wisdom. They are pragmatic "bright-line" rules that provide an instant resolution of the problem at hand. Might the same be true of the food laws of Lev 11 and Deut 14?
One might imagine ancient Israel, which has a body of social knowledge about what can and cannot be eaten, as a society that was informed by the material environment. If so, the lawgiver has the pragmatic task of finding the most effective way of communicating this to as many people as possible. The legislator could begin with some clearly worked-out paradigms (as in Lev 11 and Deut 14, in relation to land animals and aquatic creatures). But, once the lawgiver has established these, the rest can be worked out quite straightforwardly. The important thing is to get the paradigm of the land animals right first (in this case, the characteristics of hooves and cud), and this needs to be followed by the paradigm for aquatic creatures (here, the characteristics of fins and scales). The latter makes sense in light of the first category, but it is necessary to understand this as well, because the sequence builds. 82 Once these categories are in place, however, the audience does not really need to think too hard about the next category (the birds), and by the time the lawgiver reaches the insects, the laws have had such an educative effect that, by the end of this category, the audience can even cope with an exception.
In terms of what is actually posited in the food laws, the only arbitrary element 83 is the first clear statement regarding clean and unclean land animals and the second statement regarding aquatic creatures. This is why most attention is paid to these categories. 84 It is important that these paradigms are firmly fixed in the minds of the audience. Once they are in place, the next case follows from them, until the audience reaches the insects, and then the exception. Information drops away as the paradigm is understood. Within a short time, you can teach everyone what to eat-without making a meal of it. The food laws of Lev 11 and Deut 14 provide conclusive, objective tests about what is and is not edible that can be, 79 82 Cf. Houston, who claims that the subsection on aquatic creatures is "highly redundant" in Leviticus (Purity and Monotheism, 40). 83 For arbitrariness in self-executing rules, see Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics, 83-87. 84 Although it makes no difference to my argument, the order of categories (animals/aquatic creatures/birds/insects) may reflect the fact that land animals and fish are more significant food sources than birds and insects (unless they are locusts, in which case they are given particular attention). If so, it is further confirmation of the practical nature of the regulations: the most didactic teaching is given to the things people are most likely to kill for food. potentially, applied by everyone. 85 Indeed, the relative straightforwardness of the food laws is, I suggest, evidence of the fact that they are directed to the general public, and not simply to "experts. " 86 They can thus be seen as further examples of self-executing narrative rules in biblical law.
Moreover, the food laws are only rules of thumb. There is no reason why the list of clean/unclean creatures should map exactly onto Israel's experience of what food is, in fact, enjoyable. If the Priestly lawgiver is trying to educate the masses as simply and effectively as possible, it is better to have a few false negatives than to have false positives. In other words, it is better to call unclean something that is nutritionally beneficial, than to call clean something that is nutritionally harmful. 87 In this respect, too, the food laws can be seen as self-executing rules inasmuch as they provide rough-and-ready solutions. 88 Having a few false negatives is the price to be paid for having everyday rules that equip people to make judgments for themselves and reduce the need for "food experts" (found in all traditional societies) to tell people what they can and cannot eat. 89 From a practical perspective, the dietary laws should enable people to consume as much of what they would like to eat as is available in their environment. But a lawgiver cannot educate on that basis. There have to be clear and simple rules that map onto what is available for food, even though it might not include absolutely everything. Nor did you have to eat whatever fell within the paradigm of being clean. 90 The brilliance of the food laws is how they strike a balance between the need to be edible and straightforward, matching, so far as possible, normal eating practice and hallowing the mundane. The food laws do not therefore present themselves as fictional or utopian. On the contrary, they consist of a rationalizing structure of paradigm cases and binary oppositions that is pragmatic and easy to teach.
In this way, the entire substantial content and compositional strategy of the biblical food laws can be seen as an exercise and an education in practical wisdom. Their genius is that they are so practically useful. Their didactic strength is such that the audience can reel off any creature and be able to tell, instantly, whether it is clean or unclean. 91 Imagine what Moses would have made of the duck-billed platypus-a bizarre combination of animal (it's got fur), fish (it lives in water), and bird (it lays eggs). But an Israelite audience would have known straightaway. It is obviously unclean because it is a "halfway-house" creature in all respects. We do not have to say, for example, that the male platypus is unclean because it has venomous spurs, which rhetorically reminds us of the venomous serpent in Eden. Once the audience has the first couple of paradigms, it has all it needs to make sense of anything. This way of reading the text goes against the grain of most scholarly readings of Leviticus, which tend to characterize the text as ideal rather than normative and as lacking any basis in Israelite society. 92 In conclusion, I contend that reading the food laws as narrative paradigms makes sense on a number of levels. First, it explains precisely those aspects of the text that commentators have otherwise found frustrating or contradictory. Second, it explains why certain creatures, such as the pig, are specifically labeled as unclean because they are examples of hard cases that enable the rules to be clearly established. Third, it accounts for the boundaries of the different categories because they reflect paradigmatic social knowledge. Fourth, it explains the content of the food laws by connecting each category to nonstructural materialist and economic concerns. Fifth, it explains the presence of false negatives as a necessary trade-off between breadth of diet and clear teaching, while, finally, it is consistent with other biblical laws that are rooted in practical wisdom. 91 This legislative and literary achievement is all the more remarkable in the light of the difficulties we have, in modern society, of communicating what food we should eat. Even simple messages like "five servings of fruit or vegetables a day" are hard to get across, not to mention how much alcohol is safe to drink. Most people in the United Kingdom do not know how many units of alcohol they drink, what is a little, or a lot, and hundreds of people die as a result. Even in a modern context, there is a great deal to be said for a rule-of-thumb approach such as we find in biblical law, which people can clearly understand and operate, beyond the immediate case. 92 Meshel, for example, avers, "it is doubtful that Lev 11 ever served as a normative basis for Israelite society at any given historical period" ("Pure, Impure, Permitted, Prohibited, " 32-42, here 39; italics added).
